Constitutional Law - Due Process -Knowledge of the Law Required for Conviction Under Criminal Registration Ordinance by Berg, David C.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 56 Issue 6 
1958 
Constitutional Law - Due Process -Knowledge of the Law Required 
for Conviction Under Criminal Registration Ordinance 
David C. Berg 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, 
Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, and the Supreme Court 
of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David C. Berg, Constitutional Law - Due Process -Knowledge of the Law Required for Conviction Under 
Criminal Registration Ordinance, 56 MICH. L. REV. 1008 (1958). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol56/iss6/8 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1008 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 56 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW RE-
QUIRED FOR CONVICTION UNDER CRIMINAL REGISTRATION ORDINANCE-De-
fendant-appellant was charged with violation of a Los Angeles municipal 
ordinance which required all persons convicted of a felony in California, 
or of a crime committed elsewhere which would have been punishable as 
a felony in California, subsequent to January I, 1921, to register with the 
Chief of Police upon remaining in the city longer than five days, or upon 
making more than five visits to the city within a thirty-day period. At the 
time of her arrest, appellant had been a resident of Los Angeles for seven 
years. Within that period she had been convicted (in Los Angeles) of forgery, 
a felony in California, and had subsequently failed to register as required. 
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At her jury trial appellant asserted that the application of the ordinance to 
her was a denial of due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States, but was convicted, fined 
$250, and placed on probation for three years. Her motion for arrest of 
judgment and new trial was denied and the judgment affirmed on appeal 
by the Appellate Department of the Superior Court. On appeal to the 
United States Supreme Court, held, reversed, four justices dissenting.1 In 
the absence of actual knowledge or proof of facts sufficient to establish 
probable knowledge of the duty imposed by the ordinance, the conviction 
of appellant violated the due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). 
The police power has long been recognized as one of the least !imitable 
of those exercisable by local government.2 Nevertheless, a long line of 
Supreme Court decisions has imposed the vague language of the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a limitation on that power, re-
quiring that it not be exercised in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious 
manner.3 The general tests for validity which have evolved from the cases 
suggest that the legislation must concern subject matter within the scope 
of the police power; that the means of regulation adopted must bear a 
relationship to the desired end; and that fundamental rights must not be 
abridged.4 Whether specific legislation conforms to these tests is largely 
dependent on the character of the right allegedly abridged,5 and the under-
lying factual data of which a court will take judicial notice. 6 However, in 
no case will a court purport to act as a legislative body, reviewing the wis-
dom of the legislation or deciding whether the regulatory means adopted are 
the best conceivable under the circumstances.7 But all of these criteria, being 
in the nature of legal conclusions, are only slightly more informative as 
guides to validity than the language of the amendment itself. Delineation 
of the boundaries of due process as a limitation on the police power has 
been accomplished through the process of judicial inclusion and exclusion 
1 The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice Douglas. Justice Frankfurter 
dissented in an opinion in which Justices Harlan and Whittaker joined. Justice Burton 
dissented without opinion. 
2 District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138 (1909). 
s E.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 
(1934). 
¼ Brown, "Due Process, Police Power and The Supreme Court," 40 HARV. L. REv. 
943 (1927). 
5 Discussing the required relationship between the means and end the Court said, 
" .•. it is the character of the right, not of the limitation, which determines what 
standard governs the choice." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 at 530 (1945). 
6 For example, see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), where the Court 
recognized that vaccination afforded protection against smallpox; Bikle, "Judicial Deter-
mination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action," 
38 HAR.v. L. REv. 6 (1924). 
7 Mcl..ean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539 (1909). 
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as applied to specific cases.8 As a result of this process the Supreme Court, 
recognizing the need for government to enact measures for the social 
betterment, has consistently held that it is not a violation of due process 
for a state to impose criminal liability for acts or omissions unaccompanied 
by criminal intent or guilty knowledge.9 The opinion of the majority in 
the principal case recognizes and adds its approval to this line of precedent 
as applied to statutes imposing criminal penalties for acts, or for omissions 
where a person is alerted to the requirement of action by the circumstances, 
but refuses to apply the rule to an omission under conditions that do not 
warn of a duty to act.10 As pointed out by the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Frankfurter, the reason for this distinction does not seem to arise out of 
comparison of concepts of fairness, hardship, and justice as applied to the 
two situations.11 Similarly, there does not seem to be any reason for the 
distinction drawn by the majority between regulation of an activity and 
the regulation of a status acquired in consequence of an activity, so far as 
the power to enact a statute which excludes the element of scienter from 
proof of its violation is concemed.12 There is one factor, however, implicit 
in the majority opinion, which serves to distinguish the principal case. The 
individual hardship and injustice which may be the result of conviction 
without regard to knowledge and intent has been justified under the due 
process requirement by a recognition of the overriding social interest in 
the increased compliance with criminal laws secured by a facilitated en-
forcement process.18 That justification shrinks in stature when applied to 
an ordinance, the ultimate purpose of which is not to secure compliance 
with its provisions, but instead to bring about certain indirect effects. An 
analysis of the application of criminal registration ordinances suggests that 
their main purpose is not to obtain information concerning the activities 
and location of ex-criminals. It is rather to ease the law enforcement process 
by the creation of a statutory duty which will usually be neglected because 
of ignorance of its existence, thus enabling the police to arrest and detain 
s Brown, "Due Process, Police Power and The Supreme Court," 40 HARv. L. REv. 
943 (1927). 
9 United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); Chicago, B. &: Q. R. Co. v. United States, 
220 U.S. 559 (19ll); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910). 
10 T:he absence of precedent for this ·holding is suggested iby the fact that the majority 
cited in support of its opinion three decisions concerned with notice as a requirement 
of procedural due process in civil litigation. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306 (1950); Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956); Walk.er v. Hutchinson 
City, 352 U.S. 112 (1956). 
11 But see Hughes, "Criminal Omissions," 67 YALE L.J. 590 at 619 (1958), where the 
author interprets the principal case as confined to omissions " ••• where the duty to act 
arises only because of a person's presence in a certain locality.'' 
12 The majority opinion refers approvingly -to registration statutes, which are akin 
to licensing statutes in that they purport to regulate an activity. 
18 United States v. Balint, note 9 supra. 
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persons for investigation with regard to other unrelated criminal activity.14 
This is, in effect, an attempt to accomplish indirectly what could not be 
done directly.15 Abusive and discriminatory practices have in fact marked 
the history of the application of this ordinance and of similar ordinances 
in other cities.16 While these practices in themselves would not warrant 
invalidation of the ordinance, they do provide added reason for limiting 
its operation to the achievement of its avowed purpose of obtaining informa-
tion about ex-criminals-a probable result of this decision.17 Because of the 
narrow terms in which it is formulated, the decision is not calculated to 
weaken the established doctrine that ignorance of the law will not insulate 
against punishment for its violation.18 
David C. Berg 
14 See 103 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 60 (1954); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949). 
15 For more direct attempts which were declared invalid under either the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or of similar provisions of state constitutions, 
see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (gangster statute which purported to 
punish any person not engaged in a lawful occupation who had been convicted of 
disorderly conduct three times or of any crime in New Jersey or any other state, and 
who was known to be a member of a gang composed of two or more persons); People 
v. Licavoli, 264 Mich. 643, 250 N.W. 520 (1933) (proof of recent reputation for engaging 
in illegal occupation or business was deemed prima fade evidence of being engaged in 
illegal occupation or business); People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N.E. 301 (1934) 
(persons reputed to be habitual violators of the criminal laws were deemed to be 
vagabonds, punishable as such). 
16 See 103 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 60 (1954). For a recent example see 18 THE REPORTER, 
p. 25:2, March 6, 1958. 
17 The majority opinion indicates that conviction for violation of the ordinance 
would ibe valid if the accused had knowledge of its existence, or if sufficient facts were 
in evidence to establish probable knowledge. Thus law enforcement officials who wish 
to enforce the statute for informational purposes will be able to do so, provided they 
adequately publicize the registration ordinance so as to give felons notice of the statutory 
duty. 
18 This point was noted by the dissent. Principal case at 232. 
